Item 1. Security and Issuer
This statement constitutes Amendment No. 13 to the Schedule 13D, relating to the shares of common stock, par value $0.01 per share (the “Shares”), issued by Dell Inc. (the “Issuer”), and hereby amends the Schedule 13D filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on May 10, 2013, as amended by Amendment No. 1, filed with the SEC on May 13, 2013, Amendment No. 2, filed with the SEC on June 18, 2013, Amendment No. 3, filed with the SEC on July 1, 2013, Amendment No. 4, filed with the SEC on July 8, 2013, Amendment No. 5, filed with the SEC on July 8, 2013, Amendment No. 6, filed with the SEC on July 10, 2013, Amendment No. 7, filed with the SEC on July 11, 2013, Amendment No. 8, filed with the SEC on July 11, 2013, Amendment No. 9, filed with the SEC on July 12, 2013, Amendment No. 10, filed with the SEC on July 15, 2013, Amendment No. 11, filed with the SEC on July 17, 2013, and Amendment No. 12, filed with the SEC on July 18, 2013 to furnish the additional information set forth herein. All capitalized terms contained herein but not otherwise defined shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Schedule 13D.
Item 4. Purpose of Transaction
Item 4 of the Schedule 13D is hereby amended by adding the following:
On July 23, 2013, the Reporting Persons issued an open letter to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of the Issuer (the “July 23 Letter”). A copy of the July 23 Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference.
Item 7. Material to be Filed as Exhibits
Exhibit 1 July 23 Letter
SIGNATURE
After reasonable inquiry and to the best of each of the undersigned knowledge and belief, each of the undersigned certifies that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.
Dated: July 23, 2013
ICAHN PARTNERS MASTER FUND LP
ICAHN PARTNERS MASTER FUND II LP
ICAHN PARTNERS MASTER FUND III LP
ICAHN OFFSHORE LP
ICAHN PARTNERS LP
ICAHN ONSHORE LP
BECKTON CORP.
HOPPER INVESTMENTS LLC
BARBERRY CORP.
HIGH RIVER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
By: Hopper Investments LLC, general partner
By: Barberry Corp.
By:
/s/ Edward E. Mattner
Name: Edward E. Mattner
Title: Authorized Signatory
ICAHN CAPITAL LP
By: IPH GP LLC, its general partner
By: Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., its sole member
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
IPH GP LLC
By: Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., its sole member
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
ICAHN ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS L.P.
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC.
By:
/s/ SungHwan Cho
Name: SungHwan Cho
Title: Chief Financial Officer
/s/ Carl C. Icahn
_____________
CARL C. ICAHN
[Signature Page of Schedule 13D, Amendment No. 13 – Dell Inc.]
Exhibit 1
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Icahn and Southeastern Issue Open Letter to Dell Special Committee
New York, New York, July 23, 2013: Carl C. Icahn and his affiliates and Southeastern Asset Management today issued the following letter to the Dell Special Committee.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
In our years in business we have witnessed many unconscionable boards. But, we think that the ongoing “
Desperate Dell Debacle
” stands out as one of the most startling examples. Amazingly, through it all, the Special Committee continues to remind us just how much
they believe
that they are
taking care of us, watching out for us and protecting us
.
We have a number of questions
for these self-congratulatory champions of Dell stockholders.
WHY FREEZE OUT DELL STOCKHOLDERS
?
Why is the Special Committee so committed to
forcing loyal Dell stockholders out
of Dell so that our company can be sold to Michael Dell/Silver Lake at what we believe is a bargain price?
How long can boards push out and change meeting dates and hide behind the “business judgment rule”?
The answer, my friend, is “Blowin’ in the Wind”.
WILL THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE KEEP ITS PROMISE
?
On July 16 the Special Committee told us that it has
“taken extraordinary measures to ensure Mr. Dell’s neutrality and to leave the final decision with the disinterested stockholders.”
If you believe the Special Committee did not take
"extraordinary measures to ensure Mr. Dell's neutrality and to leave the final decision with the disinterested stockholders"
when they postponed last Thursday's vote, then we urge you to vote AGAINST the Michael Dell/Silver Lake transaction. If you believe the Special Committee did not take
"extraordinary measures to ensure Mr. Dell's neutrality and to leave the final decision with the disinterested stockholders"
when they refused to hold the Annual Meeting on the same date as the Special Meeting, then we urge you to vote AGAINST the Michael Dell/Silver Lake transaction.
The Special Committee asserts that they have taken
“extraordinary measures to ensure Mr. Dell’s neutrality”
, however:
1)
|
When Michael Dell/Silver Lake decided that they wanted to buy Dell, the Special Committee negotiated a Merger Agreement with them to freeze out stockholders.
|
2)
|
The Special Committee agreed to a Merger Agreement that, in our opinion, through a combination of the restrictive definition of Superior Proposal, a break up fee of up to $450 million, a matching right in favor of Michael Dell/Silver Lake, and other Michael Dell/Silver Lake friendly provisions, acted as an enormous barrier to any potential bidder.
|
3)
|
In seeking to obtain stockholder votes, Dell has embarked on a pattern of
scare tactics
, disclosing increasingly negative results and prospects.
But we believe that a number of operational decisions at Dell have created much of this bad news
. And why does the Dell Board forget to mention the $13 billion spent on enterprise software that is just beginning to show excellent results? In our opinion and the opinion of a number of experts we have spoken to, Dell’s enterprise software and cloud computing have enormous potential. Why can’t all stockholders benefit from this?
|
4)
|
To top it all off,
after promising
on July 16 to
“leave the final decision with the disinterested stockholders”
the Board adjourned the July 18 meeting. Whatever happened to the July 16 promise to “leave the final decision with the disinterested stockholders”? Again we ask why does this Board keeps protecting Michael Dell even after stockholders have spoken?
|
WE CALL ON THE DELL BOARD TO
KEEP ITS PROMISE
AND LET THE VOTE BE FINALLY DECIDED ON JULY 24. We think that – after six months – the time for soliciting is over. It’s time to vote. Do not move election day again. This is not a banana republic.
WHEN WILL WE HAVE AN ANNUAL MEETING
?
WE ALSO CALL ON THE DELL BOARD TO MOVE QUICKLY TO HOLD THE DELL ANNUAL MEETING WHEN STOCKHOLDERS WILL BE ENTITLED TO ELECT OUR SLATE OF DIRECTORS IF THE MICHAEL DELL/SILVER LAKE TRANSACTION IS DEFEATED.
Our slate has met and unanimously supports our proposed Dell self tender offer and its implementation in accordance with their fiduciary duties. As previously communicated, we believe that our proposed Dell self tender offer has a total value to tendering stockholders of approximately $15.50 to $18.00 per share.
*
*
Estimates are based upon the assumptions and calculations set forth in Definitive Additional Materials that we filed with the SEC on July 12, 2013 and July 16, 2013 and reflect only an illustration of the implied value of Dell based upon those assumptions and calculations. The foregoing and the information contained in the Definitive Additional Materials are not a prediction of the specific future market value of Dell stock or any warrant.
VOTE DOWN THE MICHAEL DELL/SILVER LAKE DEAL
. VOTE IN OUR SLATE AT THE ANNUAL MEETING WHEN IT IS HELD.
We continue to urge stockholders to vote AGAINST the Michael Dell/Silver Lake transaction. We believe the future for Dell is bright and we hope that you agree.
Sincerely,
Carl C. Icahn O. Mason Hawkins G. Staley Cates
Icahn Enterprises LP Southeastern Southeastern
Asset Management Asset Management
For assistance in voting your shares, please contact D.F. King & Co., Inc., which is assisting Icahn and Southeastern, at 1-800-347-4750 (banks and brokers call 1-212-269-5550) or by e-mail at dell@dfking.com.
NOTICE TO INVESTORS
SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISED TO READ THE PROXY STATEMENT, DATED JUNE 24, 2013, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOLICITATION OF PROXIES BY ICAHN ENTERPRISES, LP, SOUTHEASTERN ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. AND THEIR RESPECTIVE AFFILIATES FROM THE STOCKHOLDERS OF DELL INC. FOR USE AT DELL INC.’S SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON JULY 24, 2013 BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH PROXY SOLICITATION. A DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND A FORM OF PROXY HAVE BEEN MAILED TO STOCKHOLDERS OF DELL INC. AND ARE ALSO AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE AT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S WEBSITE AT
HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV
. INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH PROXY SOLICITATION IS CONTAINED IN THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT, DATED JUNE 26, 2013. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED IN THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE NO INTEREST IN DELL INC. OTHER THAN THROUGH THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF DELL INC. AS DISCLOSED IN THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT. WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT, NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED, PERMISSION FROM ANY THIRD PARTY TO INCLUDE THEIR INFORMATION IN THIS LETTER.
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
Certain statements contained in this letter, and the documents referred to in this letter, are forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, statements that are predications of or indicate future events, trends, plans or objectives. Undue reliance should not be placed on such statements because, by their nature, they are subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance or activities and are subject to many risks and uncertainties. Due to such risks and uncertainties, actual events or results or actual performance may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of the future tense or other forward-looking words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “estimate,” “should,” “may,” “will,” “objective,” “projection,” “forecast,” “management believes,” “continue,” “strategy,” “position” or the negative of those terms or other variations of them or by comparable terminology.
Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the expectations set forth in this letter include, among other things, the factors identified under the section entitled “Risk Factors” in Dell’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended February 1, 2013 and under the section entitled “Cautionary Statement Concerning Forward-Looking Information” in Dell’s Definitive Proxy Statement filed with the SEC on May 31, 2013. Such forward-looking statements should therefore be construed in light of such factors, and Icahn and Southeastern are under no obligation, and expressly disclaim any intention or obligation, to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.
PRESS CONTACTS
Carl C. Icahn
Susan Gordon
(212) 702-4309
Southeastern Asset Management
Lee Harper
(901) 818-5240