The Trian Group,1 which beneficially owns over $3.5 billion of
common stock in The Walt Disney Company (NYSE: DIS), today
announced that two respected institutional investors, the
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), the
country’s largest public pension fund, and Neuberger Berman, a
global asset manager, have expressed their support for both of
Trian’s nominees, Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, in connection with
Disney’s annual meeting, which is scheduled to be held this
Wednesday, April 3, 2024.
Both CalPERS and Neuberger Berman recognize Disney’s poor track
record of corporate governance – which includes a persistent and
significant lack of alignment between pay and performance2 and a
failure to appropriately manage CEO succession – noting that the
Disney Board would benefit from “a fresh perspective”3 and “[t]wo
new directors who are qualified and capable of leading needed
change. . . .”4
In supporting the election of Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo,
CalPERS noted the following:
- "CalPERS believes Walt Disney Co will benefit from fresh eyes
on its board of directors and voted its company shares in favor of
candidates Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo.”5
- “[CalPERS’] established voting guidelines focus on the need for
independent corporate boards, a say in setting executive pay, and
increased transparency. Two new directors who are qualified and
capable of leading needed change in corporate governance will serve
the Disney board well."6
Similarly, Neuberger Berman wrote that:
- “We believe there is opportunity to strengthen relevant
policies and practices and that the board may benefit from the
addition of a fresh perspective and more independence. For these
reasons, we intend to support the election of dissident Trian
nominees Nelson Peltz and James Rasulo to the board.”7
- “[W]e believe [Trian’s] nominees are very strong candidates
given Peltz’s large ownership of the company and extensive board
experience and Rasulo’s long-term experience while working as an
executive at Disney.”8
- “[W]e do not believe short-term TSR performance alone is an
adequate indicator of the quality of governance at a company.
Despite recent improvements, in our opinion, the deficiencies of
the board that ultimately led to the failed 2020 succession
endeavor and related consequences remain. As such, we are
unconvinced of the current board’s ability to uphold good
governance practices and fulfill one of its core responsibilities
in finding a CEO successor.9
- “[W]e have concerns regarding the Disney board’s multi-year
efforts to name a successor to CEO Bob Iger. . . . The board has
admitted to not adhering to and executing the process it had in
place for Disney’s 2020 succession plan and that Chapek’s
appointment was a strategic misstep. . . . [W]e believe these
succession planning challenges have impacted business continuity
and distracted from business performance.”10
Other investors and independent proxy advisory firms have also
indicated their support for Nelson Peltz and Trian.
Yacktman Asset Management, a value-focused investment firm,
wrote:
- “Nelson Peltz has been a director, and Trian has been a
significant shareholder, of several companies in our investment
portfolio. As a director, Nelson has brought tremendous energy and
focus to his work, successfully collaborating with management teams
and his fellow directors to improve the companies for the benefit
of all stakeholders.”11
ISS, the largest and most influential proxy advisory firm,
concluded that:
- “[I]ncremental change is needed at the company due to
multi-year underperformance [relative to] the company’s peers and
chosen benchmark, operational challenges, and most critically, a
repeated failure on the part of the board to oversee the
cultivation of a successor to Iger.”
- “[T]he key decision points that led to the company’s challenges
over the past five years, not to mention multiple activist
campaigns, can be traced to the board.”
- “. . . Peltz, as a significant shareholder, could be additive
to the succession process, providing assurance to other investors
that the board is properly engaged this time around. He could also
help evaluate future capital allocation decisions.”
Egan-Jones, another independent proxy advisory firm, also
recommended that shareholders vote for change in the composition of
Disney’s Board. Egan-Jones concluded: “We see very little downside
and a lot of upsides in putting the Trian Nominees on the Board,”12
citing an “apparent lack of a . . . long-term succession plan”13
and “mediocre financial performance and the resultant lower
valuation”14 as reasons for shareholders to vote “For” both of
Trian’s nominees, Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, and “Withhold” on
Maria Elena Lagomasino and Michael B.G. Froman.
Trian commented on the votes and recommendations from these
influential investors and research firms:
While Disney has touted the
endorsements15 of its service providers16 and advisors,17 we are
pleased to have earned the support of independent, respected
institutional investors and proxy advisory firms.
Like CalPERS, Neuberger Berman,
Yacktman, ISS, Egan-Jones, and others, we believe that change is
needed at Disney and that the election of our nominees will help
improve the focus, alignment and accountability of the Board.
We are confident that Nelson and Jay
will be far more effective in “refocusing the board on CEO
succession planning”18 and “aligning the board with shareholder
interests”19 than the directors we are seeking to replace, Maria
Elena Lagomasino and Michael B.G. Froman. These long-serving
incumbent directors have overseen Disney’s protracted succession
planning failures, persistent underperformance20 and questionable
strategic and capital allocation decisions.
By Disney’s own admission, Ms.
Lagomasino and Mr. Froman – one an advisor to wealthy families and
the other with experience in foreign affairs – possess just one
skill central to the Company’s strategy,21 a skill possessed by
every other incumbent director and by Nelson and Jay. Neither Ms.
Lagomasino nor Mr. Froman is well aligned with shareholders, unlike
Nelson and Jay, because neither owns meaningful amounts of Disney
stock.22
Critically, Ms. Lagomasino has failed
shareholders as the Chair (and previously as a member) of the
Compensation Committee.23 Disney’s executives have been paid more
than $1 billion in the last decade, even as the stock significantly
underperformed the S&P 500.24 Disney’s shareholders have long
expressed displeasure with Disney’s compensation program25 and yet
Ms. Lagomasino remains in her role. Her failure to help align pay
and performance is evident not just at Disney, but also at the
other companies on whose compensation committee she serves or
served, Coca-Cola and Avon Products, over many years.26
As we have said from the beginning,
this election contest is not about Disney’s CEO, it is about
improving the focus, alignment and accountability of Disney’s Board
so that the Company can return to delighting its consumers and
delivering value for its owners. In that context, we do not believe
Ms. Lagomasino or Mr. Froman deserves shareholder support. Change
is needed.
Our nominees, Nelson Peltz and Jay
Rasulo, bring relevant experience and pledge to work constructively
and collaboratively with the Board, as they have done with other
boards many times before. Nelson and Jay will bring a much-needed
shareholder perspective to the boardroom and will ask tough
questions, encourage open discussion and debate and set demanding
goals for the business.
To help ensure a better future for
this great company, we urge shareholders to vote “For” Nelson Peltz
and Jay Rasulo and to withhold support from Ms. Lagomasino and Mr.
Froman today. Together, we can Restore the Magic at Disney.
To ensure the election of Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, it is
essential that shareholders vote “FOR” Nelson
Peltz and Jay Rasulo, and
“WITHHOLD” on Maria Elena Lagomasino,
Michael B.G. Froman, and all three Blackwells
Nominees.
Vote now. The deadline for shareholders to vote by telephone or
electronically is Tuesday, April 2 at 11:59 PM ET.
If you previously voted, you can change that vote by voting again
now.
For more information, including voting instructions, visit our
website: www.RestoreTheMagic.com.
About Trian Fund Management, L.P.
Founded in 2005, Trian Fund Management, L.P. (“Trian”) is a
multi-billion dollar investment management firm. Trian is a highly
engaged shareowner that combines concentrated public equity
ownership with operational expertise. Leveraging the 40+ years’
operating experience of our Founding Partners, Nelson Peltz and
Peter May, Trian seeks to invest in high quality but undervalued
and underperforming public companies and to work collaboratively
with management teams and boards to help companies execute
operational and strategic initiatives designed to drive long-term
sustainable earnings growth for the benefit of all
stakeholders.
Media Contacts:
Anne A. Tarbell(212) 451-3030atarbell@trianpartners.com
Paul Caminiti / Pamela Greene / Jacqueline ZuhseReevemark(212)
433-4600Trian@reevemark.com
Investor Contacts:
Matthew Peltz(212) 451-3060mpeltz@trianpartners.com
Ryan Bunch(212) 451-3176rbunch@trianpartners.com
Bruce Goldfarb / Pat McHughOkapi Partners LLC(212) 297-0720(877)
629-6357info@okapipartners.com
Edward McCarthy / Richard Grubaugh / Thomas GerminarioD.F. King
& Co., Inc. (212) 229-2634 Disney@dfking.com
Disclaimer
Except as otherwise set forth in this press release, the views
expressed in this press release reflect the opinions of Trian Fund
Management, L.P. and its affiliates (“Trian”), and are based on
publicly available information with respect to The Walt Disney
Company (“Disney” or the “Company”). Trian recognizes that there
may be confidential information in the possession of the Company
that could lead it or others to disagree with Trian’s conclusions.
Trian reserves the right to change any of its opinions expressed
herein at any time as it deems appropriate and disclaims any
obligation to notify the market or any other party of any such
change, except as required by law. Trian disclaims any obligation
to update the information or opinions contained in this press
release, except as required by law. For the avoidance of doubt,
this press release is not affiliated with or endorsed by
Disney.
This press release is provided merely as information and is not
intended to be, nor should it be construed as, an offer to sell or
a solicitation of an offer to buy any security nor as a
recommendation to purchase or sell any security. Funds, investment
vehicles, and accounts managed by Trian currently beneficially own
shares of the Company. These funds, investment vehicles, and
accounts are in the business of trading – buying and selling –
securities and intend to continue trading in the securities of the
Company. You should assume such funds may from time to time sell
all or a portion of their holdings of the Company in open market
transactions or otherwise, buy additional shares (in open market or
privately negotiated transactions or otherwise), or trade in
options, puts, calls, swaps or other derivative instruments
relating to such shares.
Some of the materials in this press release contain
forward-looking statements. All statements contained herein that
are not clearly historical in nature or that necessarily depend on
future events are forward-looking, and the words “anticipate,”
“believe,” “expect,” “potential,” “could,” “opportunity,”
“estimate,” “plan,” “once again,” “achieve,” and similar
expressions are generally intended to identify forward-looking
statements. The projected results and statements contained herein
that are not historical facts are based on current expectations,
speak only as of the date of these materials and involve risks,
uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results,
performances or achievements to be materially different from any
future results, performances or achievements expressed or implied
by such projected results and statements. Assumptions relating to
the foregoing involve judgments with respect to, among other
things, future economic competitive and market conditions and
future business decisions, all of which are difficult or impossible
to predict accurately and many of which are beyond the control of
Trian.
The estimates, projections and potential impact of the
opportunities identified by Trian herein are based on assumptions
that Trian believes to be reasonable as of the date of this press
release, but there can be no assurance or guarantee (i) that any of
the proposed actions set forth in this press release will be
completed, (ii) that the actual results or performance of the
Company will not differ, and such differences may be material, or
(iii) that any of the assumptions provided in this press release
are accurate.
Trian has neither sought nor obtained the consent from any third
party to use any statements or information contained herein that
have been obtained or derived from statements made or published by
such third parties, nor has it paid for any such statements. Any
such statements or information should not be viewed as indicating
the support of such third parties for the views expressed herein.
Trian does not endorse third-party estimates or research which are
used herein solely for illustrative purposes.
Important Information
Trian Fund Management, L.P., together with Nelson Peltz, Peter
W. May, Josh Frank, Matthew Peltz, Isaac Perlmutter, James A.
Rasulo, Trian Fund Management GP, LLC, Trian Partners, L.P., Trian
Partners Parallel Fund I, L.P., Trian Partners Master Fund, L.P.,
Trian Partners Co-Investment Opportunities Fund, Ltd., Trian
Partners Fund (Sub)-G, L.P., Trian Partners Strategic Investment
Fund-N, L.P., Trian Partners Strategic Fund-G II, L.P., Trian
Partners Strategic Fund-K, L.P., The Laura & Isaac Perlmutter
Foundation Inc., Object Trading Corp., Isaac Perlmutter T.A., and
Zib Inc. (collectively, the “Participants”) filed a definitive
proxy statement and accompanying form of blue proxy card (as
supplemented and amended on February 12, 2024, the “Definitive
Proxy Statement”) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“SEC”) on February 1, 2024 to be used in connection with the 2024
annual meeting of shareholders of the Company.
THE PARTICIPANTS STRONGLY ADVISE ALL SHAREHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY
TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS
BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. SUCH PROXY MATERIALS
ARE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT
HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV AND TRIAN’S WEBSITE,
HTTPS://RESTORETHEMAGIC.COM. THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND
ACCOMPANYING PROXY CARD WILL BE FURNISHED TO SOME OR ALL OF THE
COMPANY’S SHAREHOLDERS. SHAREHOLDERS MAY ALSO DIRECT A REQUEST TO
EITHER OF TRIAN’S PROXY SOLICITORS, OKAPI PARTNERS LLC, 1212 AVENUE
OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 10036 (SHAREHOLDERS CAN E-MAIL
INFO@OKAPIPARTNERS.COM OR CALL TOLL-FREE: (877) 629-6357), OR D.F.
KING & CO., INC., 48 WALL STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10005
(SHAREHOLDERS CAN E-MAIL DISNEY@DFKING.COM OR CALL TOLL-FREE: (800)
207-3158).
Information about the Participants and a description of their
direct or indirect interests by security holdings or otherwise can
be found in the Definitive Proxy Statement.
1 Source: Please refer to the definitive proxy statement, filed
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission by Trian
Fund Management L.P. and certain of its affiliates and other
persons (as supplemented and amended, the “Definitive Proxy
Statement”) for information regarding the members of the “Trian
Group.” Nelson Peltz beneficially owns Disney shares worth
approximately $3.5 billion and Jay Rasulo owns Disney shares worth
approximately $800,000, in each case, as further detailed in the
Definitive Proxy Statement. Note that ownership position values are
based on Disney’s share price at the close of business on
3/29/2024.2 Since Ms. Lagomasino became Chair of Disney’s
Compensation Committee, Disney’s say-on-pay votes have averaged
just 73%, which ranks in the bottom 10% of all S&P 500
companies and Disney’s say-on-pay approval percentages have been
below the S&P 500 median every year. Say-on-pay has also been
below the average of all of the S&P 500 companies since 2018,
which is when Mr. Froman joined the Board. Source: SEC filings,
FactSet.3 NB Votes, available at:
https://www.nb.com/en/global/esg/nb-votes.4 Source: Svea
Herbst-Bayliss, Reuters, “US pension fund CalPERS backs Peltz,
Rasulo in Disney board battle,” published on 03/29/24.5 Source:
Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Reuters, “US pension fund CalPERS backs Peltz,
Rasulo in Disney board battle,” published on 03/29/24.6 Id.7 NB
Votes, available at: https://www.nb.com/en/global/esg/nb-votes.8
Id.9 Id.10 Id.11 Source: restorethemagic.com.12 Egan-Jones Proxy
Research Report, published on 03/26/24.13 Id.14 Id.15 See Disney
Investor Presentations and Letters to Shareholders filed on
02/12/24, 03/04/24, 03/11/24, 03/12/24 and 03/25/24, which
referenced endorsements from ValueAct Capital Management and J.P.
Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon.16 Blackwells Capital Investor Presentation,
03/11/24 (estimating that ValueAct has earned more than $90 million
in fees from managing assets for Disney’s pension funds).17 Source:
Anna Nicolaou, James Fontanella-Khan and Joshua Franklin, Financial
Times, “Jamie Dimon Backs Disney’s Bob Iger in Proxy Fight with
Nelson Peltz”, published on 03/13/24.18 NB Votes, available at:
https://www.nb.com/en/global/esg/nb-votes.19 Id.20 Disney has
underperformed its Media Industry Peers and the S&P 500 over
one, two, three, four and five years and during the tenures of each
of the incumbent directors. Source: FactSet. Note: Disney
performance measures total shareholder return (“TSR”) through
03/29/24, defined as the total return an investor would have
received if they purchased one share of stock on the first day of
the measured period, inclusive of share price appreciation and
dividends paid. “Media Industry Peers” represents the simple
average and consists of Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Comcast, Meta,
Netflix, Paramount, and Warner Bros. Discovery. We highlight the
S&P 500 here only as a widely recognized index; however, for
various reasons, the performance of the index and that of the
securities mentioned above may not be comparable. One cannot invest
directly in an index. Note: James Gorman and D. Jeremy Darroch
excluded due to less than one year of tenure on the Board.21 Per
Disney’s 2024 Proxy Statement, Mr. Froman and Ms. Lagomasino
possess just one skill that Disney defines as “Central to Disney’s
Strategy”: “360 Degree Brand Activation,” which is a skill that is
also possessed by every other director on Disney’s Board.22 Mr.
Froman and Ms. Lagomasino beneficially own Disney shares worth
approximately $5 million. By comparison, the Trian Group
beneficially owns over $3.5 billion in Disney shares. Note that
ownership position values are based on Disney’s share price at the
close of business on 3/29/2024.23 Ms. Lagomasino has served as
Chair of the Compensation Committee since 2019 and a member of the
Committee since 2016.24 Source: SEC filings, FactSet. TSR measured
from Disney’s fiscal year 2013 ended 09/28/13 through 09/30/23.25
Since Ms. Lagomasino became Chair of Disney’s Compensation
Committee, Disney’s say-on-pay votes have averaged just 73%, which
ranks in the bottom 10% of all S&P 500 companies, and Disney’s
say-on-pay approval percentages have been below the S&P 500
median every year. Say-on-pay has also been below the average of
all of the S&P 500 companies since 2018, which is when Mr.
Froman joined the Board. Source: SEC filings, FactSet.26 Coca-Cola
received just 50% support for its say-on-pay proposal in 2022,
while Avon Products received 56%, 56% and 71% support in 2013, 2014
and 2015, respectively, earning an “F” Pay-for-Performance Grade
from Glass Lewis in each such year.
Walt Disney (NYSE:DIS)
Historical Stock Chart
Von Okt 2024 bis Nov 2024
Walt Disney (NYSE:DIS)
Historical Stock Chart
Von Nov 2023 bis Nov 2024