The Fund files its complete schedule of investments of Fund holdings with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for the first and third quarters of each fiscal year on Form N-Q within sixty days after period end. The Funds Forms N-Q will be available on the SECs website at http://www.sec.gov, and may be reviewed and copied at the
SECs Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. Information on the operation of the Public Reference Room may be obtained by calling 1-800-SEC-0330.
A description of the policies and procedures that the Fund uses to determine how to vote proxies relating to fund securities, as well as information relating to how a Fund voted proxies relating to fund
securities during the most recent 12-month period ended June 30, is available (i) without charge, upon request, by calling 1-888-826-5646; and (ii) on the SECs website at http://www.sec.gov.
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Dear Shareholder:
We are pleased to provide you with the Annual Report
for the Sands Capital Global Growth Fund (the Fund) for the year ended October 31, 2012. During the past 12 months, the Funds Institutional Shares and Investor Shares returned 9.90% and 9.68%, respectively, compared to an
8.55% return for the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI).
At the end of the reporting period, the portfolio owned 37 businesses representing
eight of the ten economic sectors that comprise the MSCI ACWI Index (Index). Relative to the Index, contribution from sector weighting over the reporting period was negative. As with country exposures, the portfolios sector
allocations are a residual of our bottom-up, fundamental approach to portfolio construction. Over our investment horizon (5+ years), we expect stock selection, not sector allocation, to be the main driver of long-term results. Individual stock
selection in Consumer Discretionary was the largest detractor, while selection was best within Information Technology.
On a relative basis,
the top five contributors to performance were Visa, Naspers, ASML Holding, ARM Holdings, and Apple. ASML is the dominant (~80% market share) supplier of lithographic tools that transfer circuit patterns to circuits in the semiconductor manufacturing
process. We believe the companys technology-based competitive advantage is largely derived from its R&D efforts which are unmatched in the industry, providing ASML with a virtually insurmountable lead over its competitors. Our research
gives us conviction that these efforts have put ASML in the unique position to set the technological path and timetable necessary to ensure the continuation of Moores Law the observation that the number of transistors on integrated
circuits doubles every two years in the manufacturing process. Lithographys complexity continues to increase geometrically as the market demands more transistors per chip. This in turn requires a thinner and more accurate lithographic
projection of circuit lines on chips. Over the years, we think ASMLs robust R&D efforts and solid operational execution have strengthened its position at the choke point of the semiconductor value chain. We think ASMLs pricing power
and durable competitive advantages, combined with the continued growth of the semiconductor industry, will result in 20%+ annualized revenue growth over the next five years.
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The top five relative detractors from performance were New Oriental, Facebook, Hero Moto Corp., Li & Fung, and Kuehne & Nagel. Usage of Facebook is rapidly shifting from desktop to
mobile devices. Investor concerns over Facebooks ability to monetize its mobile platform appear to be a key factor pressuring valuation over the reporting period. We think Facebook is strongly positioned to monetize mobile usage over our
investment horizon. The companys newly created Sponsored Story mobile ad format (advertisements visible in both the desktop and mobile News Feeds) is a key differentiator that we think provides a stronger value proposition to advertisers than
any other mobile display advertisement currently available, as indicated by engagement metrics. We think the social context of a paid-for News Feed post makes this ad format compelling to advertisers while limiting user intrusion. There is
tremendous room for growth: the third quarter of 2012 is the first full quarter of mobile monetization and Facebook is only in the beginning steps of rolling out mobile ad formats and introducing new monetization strategies, such as the recently
introduced Offers and Gifts. Although we think it will take time for advertisers to adopt Facebooks ad solutions, as is typical with new formats or product offerings, we are encouraged by the companys early mobile ad results
and the growing advertiser demand for mobile ad impressions. Given the potential of these initiatives, we expect mobile monetization to meaningfully contribute to our expected annual revenue growth of 35% over the next five years.
Learning from Our Successes and Failures
Identifying Patterns
In previous
reports, we have discussed what we think are key elements of our investment strategy, such as our global macro Headwinds and Tailwinds framework. In this letter, we respond to a provocative and frequently asked question: What have
you learned from your mistakes?
Investing is a humbling experience, with equity markets teaching investors lessons on a daily basis. We
believe much can be learned from mistakes as well as successes. Over the years, we have asked this question of ourselves by performing postmortems on investment outcomes. Through this evaluation, we try to identify and understand what helped and
what hurt. This is a key piece of our ongoing work to refine and improve our investment process.
The goal of our analysis is to make better
decisions at the portfolio level. Identifying good and bad patterns can help us recognize factors that may
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contribute to the success or failure of future investments. We aim to identify best-practice thinking, determine which mental models are working or may be deficient, and then integrate these
findings into our research process.
Upon reflecting on our positive and negative investment experiences since the inception of our Fund
(3/31/2010), we have identified a number of patterns that inform our investment process. In this letter, we highlight four patterns associated with failures and three patterns associated with successes.
Learning from Our Mistakes Identifying Patterns of Poor Outcomes
No one consistently avoids mistakes and poor outcomes. They are a part of the business of portfolio management. However, we strive to reduce the impact that poor investments have on the overall portfolio.
We think learning from mistakes and taking steps to avoid repeating them is one way to reach this goal.
Looking back over the last several
years, weve found a number of patterns that detracted from results, including the following characteristics of companies that underperformed:
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1.
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A weaker fit with our six investment criteria
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2.
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Failure to meet our growth expectations
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3.
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Failure to anticipate the maturation of primary growth engines
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4.
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Poor execution by company management
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Pattern 1:
A weaker fit with our six investment criteria can lead to mediocre or poor investment outcomes
As a reminder, we seek to add value and reduce risk using our six investment criteria. We like businesses that: 1) have visible and sustainable growth
drivers; 2) are standout leaders in attractive business spaces; 3) possess clear competitive advantages; 4) have strong management teams; 5) have robust financial strength; and 6) are reasonably priced. By adhering to these criteria, we believe we
reduce the probability of poor investment outcomes. Our criteria are certainly subject to judgment in their application and we recognize that not every business actually delivers on the potential we project in our investment case.
We believe the application of our six investment criteria establishes a high bar for companies to be included in the portfolio. However, the reality is
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that some companies are stronger fits with these criteria than others. For example, some companies have multiple layers of competitive advantage, such as a combination of patents,
strong brands, and dominant distribution, which strengthens the fit with our third criterion. We attempt to adjust our portfolio weights based on the relative strength of fit and our overall conviction in the holding. As a result, stronger fits and
higher conviction holdings tend to have significantly higher weights in the portfolio, which we think has added value over time.
Some of our
mistakes have resulted from buying companies that have marginal competitive advantages or leadership positions that begin to be eroded by competitors. As you can imagine, a loss in competitive advantage may lead to loss of market share, pricing
power, and profitability. A relatively recent example is
Cree Inc.
, which we sold from the Fund in the second quarter of 2011.
Cree:
Example of Weaker Fit
Our investment case for
Cree Inc.
, one of the worlds largest suppliers of light-emitting diodes (LEDs),
was based on two key factors:
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1.
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The accelerating adoption of LEDs in the large general-purpose lighting market ($120 billion commercial opportunity)
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2.
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Crees ability to expand its market share leadership and maintain a pricing premium based on its unique value proposition higher quality, efficiency, and
longevity delivered by its LED components
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Prior to making an investment, an important component of our research process
and investment case is the construction of a hypothetical sell case. This highlights the key metrics and events that, if met, would spur the analyst and Portfolio Management Team to reevaluate the companys prospects. Based on
Crees sell case, we closely monitored relevant key metrics gross margin stability, market share, and LED efficacy advantage in an attempt to detect any material change in Crees leadership position after buying the holding
in the first quarter of 2011.
Over the course of our investment, this monitoring eventually revealed that Cree did not have the pricing power
we anticipated. We also learned that Crees competitive advantages exclusive focus on the general-lighting segment of the LED market and quality of its components and lighting
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packages might not be as durable as we initially thought. As part of our ongoing research into the company, we dived more deeply into these aspects of the business. To do so, our
investment team conducted calls with both management and industry experts. We also traveled to China and Taiwan to meet its competitors and customers.
Through this research, we learned of a threat to Crees dominance. An oversupply of lower-end LED components LED components that backlight TV and computer screens had saturated the LED
backlighting market, which spurred many of Crees competitors to focus on improving their production processes for high-end LED lighting applications. The market largely accepted these lighting LED products as good enough
alternatives to Crees pricier products. At the same time, given the attractive growth opportunity presented by LEDs, a number of well-funded competitors (for example, Samsung and LG) entered the market, further intensifying price competition.
As a result, Crees competitive position and pricing power began to erode, weakening its fit with our key investment criteria. At this point, we made the decision to sell Cree from the Fund.
In summary, we bought Cree for its leadership in manufacturing LED lighting components, believing its patents and technical trade secrets would defend its
position. However, competitors began to produce good enough LED components for general lighting, which ultimately negatively affected pricing and gross margins. In retrospect, Crees competitive advantages were more marginal than
initially expected.
The
lesson learned
from this particular investment is that when we find ourselves increasingly concerned about the strength and durability of a business competitive advantages, we should recognize that the
investment may not fully meet our criteria and therefore should not be a part of the Funds portfolio.
Pattern 2:
Failure to meet our growth expectations, which may have been too aggressive
Many of our successful outcomes are those where we have
built conviction and visibility into higher rates of projected revenue and earnings growth relative to consensus. It follows, therefore, that our failures were often businesses that did not deliver on these growth expectations.
The chief lesson for assessing growth expectations is two-fold. First, it is important to build growth projections that capture the most likely outcome,
while not being too aggressive or too conservative. To guard against this,
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we conduct significant in-depth research into our companies. We also use many inputs to calibrate our estimates, including discussions with users, industry experts, competitors, and management.
Because reality is likely to differ from our models, we build multiple scenarios for our businesses, including downside, base, and upside cases. We actively think about potential challenges to growth, as well as potential sources of upside. We
believe the combination of independent, in-depth research coupled with rigorous scenario analysis provides a process for reasonably calibrating growth expectations.
Second, we recognize that growth expectations and valuations are intimately linked. They are two sides of the same coin. It is important to acknowledge that valuations may fall dramatically when
businesses with high projected growth rates fail to deliver the expected growth. Because we take this risk seriously, we spend considerable time assessing not only the long-term growth prospects, but also the valuation (criterion 6). We use
valuation techniques to estimate an expected or internal rate of return based on our models. If the expected returns are not attractive, then we will not invest in the business, even if we think it is a great business.
After we buy a business, we continue to closely track its development relative to our expectations. Failure to meet our growth expectations tells us our
original assumptions and estimates may be too optimistic. In addition to the scenario analysis described above, we have implemented processes to review and challenge growth assumptions. These range from informal model reviews to detailed
and formal company reviews by the Portfolio Management Team. Sometimes a member of the Investment Team acts as a devils advocate to challenge the investment case and provide fresh perspective. These processes are in
place to help ensure that our growth estimates are reasonable.
Pattern 3:
Failure to anticipate the maturation of primary
growth engines
As a firm that is focused on sustainable growth and that takes a low-turnover approach, we pride ourselves on being
long-term oriented. On balance, we think sticking with businesses as they grow over many years has added value for clients. However, we acknowledge that this orientation can increase the risk of owning a growth business past its prime, causing us to
give back some of the stocks performance from the finite period of above-average growth.
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We believe that over the years we have become more disciplined about selling in a timelier manner. One useful tool is the lifecycle or S-curve mental model. We evaluate and monitor where each of our
businesses lies on the lifecycle curve (hyper/emerging growth stage, classic/growth stage, and duration/mature growth stage), so we can attempt to anticipate when they may begin to decelerate or mature. We incorporate that information into proactive
decision making. This may result in weight reductions as companies move up the S-curve and outright sales prior to maturation.
Pattern 4:
Poor execution by management can lead to negative business and investment outcomes
While we strive to invest alongside management teams that have built strong track records, theres no guarantee they wont make poor decisions
after we invest. Though it may be hard to predict missteps, sometimes we have been slow to recognize the magnitude of the fall-out from poor execution. The key lessons here are: 1) recognize major missteps; 2) understand the magnitude of impact on
the business; and 3) at times, sell a business based on this dynamic. While it often is prudent to give management sufficient time to work through short-term bumps in the road, sometimes they should be sent to the proverbial sell block
if we think the poor execution is disruptive enough to the overall growth prospects. The ongoing challenge is separating major missteps from minor gaffes.
Hypermarcas S/A
, a Brazilian consumer goods company with a strong portfolio of OTC/pharmaceutical and personal care products, illustrates our challenge. Hypermarcas appeared able to deliver
sustainable above-average growth by combining strong organic growth with an aggressive M&A strategy in a fragmented market. Our investment case for Hypermarcas was based on our conviction in 1) continued organic growth; 2) successful
consolidation of recent acquisitions; and 3) a strong pipeline of attractive M&A candidates.
A series of missteps occurred in 2010 when
Hypermarcas raised additional capital and accelerated its M&A activity. One of the first clues was the companys acquisition of Mantecorp, the largest transaction in the companys history and an expensive one in comparison to
recent activity in the sector. In the following months, it became clear that Brazils macro environment was worsening due to threats of rising inflation, higher interest rates, and a deceleration in consumer spending.
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In the face of this challenging economic environment, management decided to raise its prices and make payment terms less favorable for its distribution network. In response, distribution partners
significantly decreased inventory levels. The increased opacity of Hypermarcas distribution channels led our research team to conduct due-diligence trips in Brazil to visit stores and distributors, speak with management, and meet industry
contacts. We began to recognize that it would take much longer than management thought for Hypermarcas customers to return to normalized purchasing behavior. It became apparent that management lacked the foresight to understand the
implications of its decision to change payment terms. Accordingly, our conviction in the business further decreased and we sold Hypermarcas from the Fund in the third quarter of 2011.
The companys management team had a strong track record of executing roll-ups that integrated new acquisitions. However, in our view, it made a series of missteps that ultimately derailed
Hypermarcas growth prospects. As a result, we have learned to be even more critical of management given the effect that poor decisions can have on a companys growth, especially in a global context.
Learning from Our Successes Identifying Patterns of Positive Outcomes
While our contributors to performance since inception have met our six investment criteria, they exhibited certain patterns we think were critical to their success. Three of the patterns are:
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1.
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Development of key insights into a major shift within an industry or sector, often by identifying new and disruptive business models
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2.
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Identifying a big gap between our long-term projections and consensus estimates
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3.
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Identifying dominant businesses at choke points within a value chain
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Pattern 1:
Development of key insights into a major shift within an industry or sector, often by identifying new and disruptive business models
In our experience, the companies that most disrupt the established patterns of their industry or sector are often big contributors to our performance.
This makes intuitive sense. Businesses that create new market opportunities or take significant market share within a large industry or sector can scale into much larger businesses.
8
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Given our bottom-up fundamental approach, we tend to first identify companies that meet our investment criteria. Then, after significant due diligence and monitoring of the business, we begin to recognize
the transformative or disruptive nature of the business. For example, the Fund owns businesses that are benefiting from the secular shift of consumer spending online and owns others that are leading the migration of the enterprise software industry
to cloud computing and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).
Pattern 2:
Identification of a big gap between our long-term projections
and consensus estimates
A major benefit of conducting independent and proprietary analysis of companies is that it allows us to identify
potential gaps between our view of a companys growth prospects and consensus. We emphasize the long-term, looking five years out. Our long-term lens is important because we believe consensus estimates tend to systematically underappreciate the
long-term growth opportunities for high-quality innovative companies. Correctly identifying a gap distinguishes many of our successes.
In
general, estimates for many of our holdings show a widening gap from consensus estimates in the out-years, typically in years three through five. In some cases, the growth gap can be quite large. In these instances, if our insights are
correct and support our projections, the investment has the potential to add value as consensus estimates catch up over time. We are always searching for situations where our estimates and consensus show a wide gap, and where our conviction in this
gap is high.
Pattern 3:
Identification of dominant businesses positioned at a choke point within a value chain
All companies compete in a value chain, and we believe some are better positioned than others. We refer to the step in the value chain
that confers the most control as the choke point of the industry. Dominating this step can often lead to pricing power and higher relative levels of profitability. This position at the choke point usually allows a company to better
weather headwinds and risks facing the overall industry because they can pass on costs to customers or adjust with greater stability. We think identifying businesses in this position is another pattern that can add value.
Visa
is positioned at a choke point in the payment-processing value chain. While there are thousands of banks and issuers on one end of credit card
transactions and millions of merchant acceptance locations on the other,
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there are only two major payment networks that connect the parties. We view Visas position in this value chain as its major competitive advantage, given that it operates in a relatively
benign competitive environment while leveraging the largely fixed-cost base of its global electronic processing platform to increase margins and generate growing free cash flow. Importantly, this choke point position enabled Visa to weather the
impact of the Durbin Amendment, which gave the U.S. Federal Reserve oversight over debit interchange fees. This issue pressured Visas stock during 2010 and the first half of 2011. As we researched the potential impacts of the Durbin Amendment,
we increased our conviction that Visas dominant position at the choke point should remain unchanged, and that Visas network processing fees (which are separate from interchange fees) would largely go unscathed. A year later, the rule was
finalized and, as we expected, there was minimal impact to Visas positioning in the value chain or its core business. As investors gained comfort with this reality the stock has performed well.
Conclusion
At Sands Capital, we want to
advance the culture of a learning organization. This means critically evaluating both our successes and failures, identifying important patterns, and integrating best practices. This continuous dialogue among our investment professionals can
sharpen the saw of our research process and the application of our six investment criteria. We believe it will continue to raise the bar for inclusion in our concentrated and conviction-weighted portfolio.
We greatly appreciate your interest and support, and we look forward to providing future updates on our investment approach and results.
Sincerely,
T
HE
S
ANDS
C
APITAL
M
ANAGEMENT
I
NVESTMENT
T
EAM
This material
represents the managers assessment of the Fund and market environment at a specific point in time and should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice.
Definition of the Comparative Index
The MSCI All Country World Index
is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed and emerging markets.
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OCTOBER 31, 2012
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GROWTH OF A $10,000 INVESTMENT
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TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS OF THE ADVISORS INNER CIRCLE FUND (Unaudited)
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Name, Address,
Age
1
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Position(s) Held
with the Trust
and Length of
Time
Served
2
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Principal Occupation(s)
During the Past 5 Years
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OFFICERS
3
(continued)
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TIMOTHY D. BARTO
44 yrs. old
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Vice President and Assistant Secretary
(Since 1999)
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General Counsel and Secretary of SIMC and the Administrator since 2004. Vice President of SIMC and the Administrator since 1999. Vice
President and Assistant Secretary of SEI Investments since 2001. Assistant Secretary of SIMC, the Administrator and the Distributor, and Vice President of the Distributor from 1999 to 2003.
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KERI ROHN
32 yrs. old
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Privacy Officer (Since 2009) AML Officer (Since 2011)
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Compliance Officer at SEI Investments since 2003.
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JOHN MUNCH
41 yrs. old
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Vice President and Assistant Secretary
(Since 2012)
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Attorney at SEI Investments Company since 2001.
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1
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Unless otherwise noted, the business address of each trustee is SEI Investments Company, 1 Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, Pennsylvania 19456.
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2
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Each Trustee shall hold office during the lifetime of this trust until the election and qualification of his or her successor, or until he or she sooner dies, resigns,
or is removed in accordance with the Trusts Declaration of Trust.
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3
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Board Members oversee 45 funds in The Advisors Inner Circle
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Other Directorships
Held by Trustee/Officer
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None.
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None.
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None.
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DISCLOSURE OF FUND EXPENSES
(Unaudited)
|
All mutual funds have operating expenses. As a shareholder of a mutual fund,
your investment is affected by these ongoing costs, which include (among others) costs for fund management, administrative services, and shareholder reports like this one. It is important for you to understand the impact of these costs on your
investment returns.
Operating expenses such as these are deducted from the mutual funds gross income and directly reduce your final
investment return. These expenses are expressed as a percentage of the mutual funds average net assets; this percentage is known as the mutual funds expense ratio.
The following examples use the expense ratio and are intended to help you understand the ongoing costs (in dollars) of investing in your Fund and to compare these costs with those of other mutual funds.
The examples are based on an investment of $1,000 made at the beginning of the period shown and held for the entire period.
The table on the
next page illustrates your Funds costs in two ways:
Actual Fund Return.
This section helps you to estimate the
actual expenses after fee waivers that your Fund incurred over the period. The Expenses Paid During Period column shows the actual dollar expense cost incurred by a $1,000 investment in the Fund, and the Ending Account Value
number is derived from deducting that expense cost from the Funds gross investment return.
You can use this information, together with
the actual amount you invested in the Fund, to estimate the expenses you paid over that period. Simply divide your actual account value by $1,000 to arrive at a ratio (for example, an $8,600 account value divided by $1,000 = 8.6), then multiply that
ratio by the number shown for your Fund under Expenses Paid During Period.
Hypothetical 5% Return.
This
section helps you compare your Funds costs with those of other mutual funds. It assumes that the Fund had an annual 5% return before expenses during the year, but that the expense ratio (Column 3) for the period is unchanged. This example is
useful in making comparisons because the Securities and Exchange Commission requires all mutual funds to make this 5% calculation. You can assess your Funds comparative cost by comparing the hypothetical result for your Fund in the
Expense Paid During Period column with those that appear in the same charts in the shareholder reports for other mutual funds.
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DISCLOSURE OF FUND EXPENSES
(Unaudited) (Concluded)
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Note:
Because the return is set at 5% for comparison purposes
NOT your Funds actual return the account values shown may not apply to your specific investment.
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Beginning
Account
Value
5/01/12
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Ending
Account
Value
10/31/12
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Annualized
Expense
Ratios
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Expenses
Paid
During
Period*
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Sands Capital Global Growth Fund
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Actual Fund Return
|
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Institutional Shares
|
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$
|
1,000.00
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$
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978.70
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1.10
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%
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$
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5.49
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Investor Shares
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1,000.00
|
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977.80
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1.35
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6.73
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Hypothetical 5% Return
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Institutional Shares
|
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$
|
1,000.00
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$
|
1,019.66
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1.10
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%
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$
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5.60
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Investor Shares
|
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1,000.00
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1,018.40
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1.35
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6.87
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*
|
Expenses are equal to the Funds annualized expense ratio multiplied by the average account value over the period, multiplied by 184/365 (to reflect the
commencement of operations period shown).
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NOTICE TO SHAREHOLDERS
(Unaudited)
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For shareholders that do not have an October 31, 2012 tax year end, this notice is for informational purposes only. For
shareholders with an October 31, 2012 tax year end, please consult your tax advisor as to the pertinence of this notice. For the fiscal year ended October 31, 2012, the Portfolio is designating the following items with regard to
distributions paid during the year.
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Long Term
Capital Gain
Distribution
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Ordinary
Income
Distributions
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Total
Distributions
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Qualifying for
Corporate
Dividends
Rec.
Deduction
(1)
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Qualifying
Dividend
Income
(2)
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U.S.
Government
Interest
(3)
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Interest
Related
Dividend
(4)
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Short Term
Capital Gain
Dividends
(5)
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73.53
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%
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26.47
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%
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100.00
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%
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100.00
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%
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100.00
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%
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0.00
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%
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0.00
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%
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100.00
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%
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(1)
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Qualifying dividends represent dividends which qualify for the corporate dividend received deduction and are reflected as a percentage of ordinary income
distributions (the total of short term capital gain and net investment income distributions).
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(2)
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The percentage in this column represents the amount of Qualifying Dividend Income as created by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
and is reflected as a percentage of ordinary income distributions (the total of short term capital gain and net investment income distributions). It is the intention of each of the aforementioned Portfolios to designate the maximum amount permitted
by law.
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(3)
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U.S. Government Interest represents the amount of interest that was derived from direct U.S. Government obligations and distributed during the fiscal
year. This amount is reflected as a percentage of ordinary income. Generally, interest from direct U.S. Government obligations is exempt from state income tax. However, for shareholders of The Advisors Inner Circle Fund Sands Capital
Growth Fund who are residents of California, Connecticut and New York, the statutory threshold requirements were not satisfied to permit exemption of these amounts from state income.
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(4)
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The percentage in this column represents the amount of Interest Related Dividend as created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 and is reflected as
a percentage of net investment income distributions that is exempt from U.S. withholding tax when paid to foreign investors. This provision of the IRC will be expiring for years beginning after December 31, 2010.
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(5)
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The percentage in this column represents the amount of Short-Term Capital Gain Dividends as created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 and is
reflected as a percentage of short-term capital gain distributions that is exempt from U.S. withholding tax when paid to foreign investors. This provision of the IRC will be expiring for years beginning after December 31, 2010.
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The information reported herein may differ from the information and distributions taxable to the shareholders for the
calendar year ending December 31, 2012. Complete information will be computed and reported in conjunction with your 2012 Form 1099-DIV.
47
Sands Capital Global Growth Fund
P.O. Box 219009
Kansas City, MO 64121
888-826-5646
Adviser:
Sands Capital Management, LLC
1101 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 2300
Arlington, VA 22209
Distributor:
SEI Investments Distribution Co.
Oaks, PA 19456
Administrator:
SEI Investments Global Funds Services
Oaks, PA 19456
Legal Counsel:
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm:
Ernst & Young, LLP
2005 Market Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19103
This information must be preceded or accompanied by a
current prospectus for the Fund described.
SAN-AR-001-0300