March 24,
2022
ABBOTT
LABORATORIES
Please
Support Proposal for Report on Lobbying Spending and
Governance
To Abbott
Laboratories Shareholders:
The Unitarian
Universalist Common Endowment Fund LLC is urging shareholders to
vote FOR Item 7 at the Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) shareholder
meeting on April 29, 2022.
This notice of
exempt solicitation is being provided on a voluntary basis.
The proposal
asks Abbott to prepare an annual report on the governance,
management oversight, policies and expenditures related to federal
and state lobbying.
Resolved, the shareholders of Abbott request the preparation
of a report, updated annually, disclosing:
|
1. |
Company policy and procedures governing lobbying, both direct
and indirect, and grassroots lobbying communications. |
|
2. |
Payments by Abbott used for (a) direct or indirect lobbying or
(b) grassroots lobbying communications, in each case including the
amount of the payment and the recipient. |
|
3. |
Abbott’s membership in and payments to any tax-exempt
organization that writes and endorses model legislation. |
|
4. |
Description of management’s and the Board’s decision-making
process and oversight for making payments described in sections 2
and 3 above. |
Transparency
and accountability in corporate spending to influence public policy
are in the best interests of Abbott shareholders. Without a clear
system ensuring accountability, corporate assets can be used to
promote public policy objectives which can pose reputational and
misalignment risks to the detriment of shareholder value.
Proponent has
reached out to the company on multiple occasions over the last
several years to invite dialogue on lobbying disclosure. Finally in
2022, a conversation took place with in-house counsel to “assess
whether further conversation with public policy staff was
warranted.” There was no further communication from the
company.
Abbott’s
missing disclosures
The Company’s
current disclosures around its lobbying expenditures and oversight
does not address the requests in this proposal. Below are the four
asks in this proposal and Abbott’s responses:
|
1. |
Company policy and procedures governing lobbying, both direct
and indirect, and grassroots lobbying communications. |
|
· |
Abbott only discloses those responsible for the management and
oversight of lobbying, not the actual policy and procedures that
guide the process. |
|
2. |
Payments by Abbott used for (a) direct or indirect lobbying or
(b) grassroots lobbying communications, in each case including the
amount of the payment and the recipient. |
|
· |
Abbott does not report the amounts spent for indirect lobbying
or grassroots communications. |
|
· |
Company reports direct lobbying expenditures to the required
offices in the Senate and House of Representatives. In other words,
Abbott obeys the law. Since we would expect any company in which we
invest to be law abiding, this is a low bar for performance. |
|
3. |
Abbott’s membership in and payments to any tax-exempt
organization that writes and endorses model legislation. |
|
· |
The Company is silent about whether it supports such
organizations. |
|
4. |
Description of management’s and the Board’s decision-making
process and oversight for making payments described in sections 2
and 3 above. |
|
· |
Nothing is reported on the decision-making process by
management or the framework for oversight by the board. |
Summary
analysis
|
1. |
Abbott Laboratories expends a significant amount of money on
lobbying, $4.3 million in 2021.1 |
|
2. |
Shareholders are paying increasing attention to corporate
lobbying. Lobbying related resolutions have recently received
majority votes at Exxon, FedEx, Norfolk Southern, Netflix and Geo
Group. |
|
3. |
Abbott’s peers provide lobbying disclosure consistent with that
requested in this proposal. |
|
4. |
The Company points to its rating on the CPA-Zicklin Index as
evidence that its lobbying disclosure is best practice. But the
Zicklin Index rates election spending disclosure, not lobbying
disclosure. |
|
5. |
The lack of transparency and clear accountability around
corporate lobbying creates risks to the company and its investors:
potential damage to reputation and misalignment between lobbying
efforts and company strategy and values. |
1. Abbott’s
spending on lobbying is significant
Nationally,
according to several studies2, corporate spending on
lobbying represents at least ten times corporate election spending.
And Abbott’s spending on lobbying is substantial.
_____________________________
1
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000000383
2
Political activity of firms: The role of firm-lobbying networks and
industry trade associations, Indraneel Chakraborty, Richard Evans
and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach;
https://www.depts.ttu.edu/rawlsbusiness/about/finance/research-seminar/documents/Lobbying_CEF_01Apr2015.pdf;
Adam Bonica, “Avenues of Influence: On the Political
Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives,”
December 3, 2013
Federal
lobbying
Abbott is
among the top three medical device companies in lobbying
spending.
|
· |
Abbott spent $8,390,000 in 2020 and 2021 on federal lobbying
activities. |
|
· |
Since 2010, Abbott has spent $46.1 million on federal
lobbying. |
|
· |
Abbott was one of the top three lobbying medical device
companies for the previous five years,3 while a new study published by JAMA found that
Abbott spent $96.6 million on its lobbying efforts from 1999 to
2018.4 |
State
lobbying
Abbott’s
spending at the state level is likely significant, but information
difficult to find. Obtaining comprehensive information on lobbying
at the state level is described by one expert as “nearly
impossible” given “the ‘Byzantine’ manner in which the data is
captured and made available online” which effectively buries
information at many states.5
|
· |
Abbott’s state-level lobbying spending is likely significant,
reportedly lobbying in 37 states.6 |
|
· |
In California, where disclosure is mandated, Abbott spent
$1,116,882 from 2010 to 2021 on lobbying.7 |
International lobbying
|
· |
Abbott also lobbies abroad, reportedly spending between
€200,000 – €299,000 on lobbying in Europe for
2020.8 |
2. Investor
support for lobbying transparency
Because of the
reputational risk and potential damage to shareholder value, there
is growing investor support worldwide for lobbying transparency
from their portfolio companies.
|
· |
In the fall of 2019, 200 institutional investors with a
combined $6.5 trillion in assets under management issued a
report entitled “Investor Expectations on Climate Lobbying” that
called on companies to disclose their “direct and indirect lobbying
on climate change policies” and “The company’s membership in, or
support for, third party organizations that engage on climate
change issues.”9 |
_____________________________
3
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/medical-device-makers-spend-millions-lobbying-loosen-regs-d-c-n940351
4
https://www.medtechdive.com/news/advamed-medtronic-among-top-20-pharma-and-health-product-lobbyists-of-the/573362/
5
“Wal-Mart Improves Lobbying Disclosure after Shareholder Push,”
Reuters, May 13, 2015,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wal-mart-stores-disclosure-lobbying-e/exclusive-wal-mart-improves-lobbying-disclosure-after-shareholder-push-idUSKBN0NY0AH20150513.
6
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/here-are-the-interests-lobbying-in-every-statehouse/
7
https://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Lobbying/Employers/Detail.aspx?id=1146891&session=2021&view=activity.
8
https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=578132036311-72.
9
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/200-investors-call-us-companies-align-climate-lobbying-paris-agreement
|
· |
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN)
representing more than $18 trillion in assets, supports
lobbying disclosure and political spending disclosure as best
practice, and supports disclosure of any payments over
$10,000.10 |
|
· |
Last year, support for shareholder proposals on corporate
political activity reached record levels (43% in 2021 versus 36% in
2020) 11 including 14 majority votes.12 This
is unprecedented and reflects growing investor concerns about the
risks inherent in corporate lobbying on public policy issues. |
|
· |
In 2022, some 46 shareholder proposals requesting enhanced
lobbying transparency have been filed and 18 withdrawn by March 14
after proponents came to agreement with
companies.13 |
3. Other
companies are reporting on significant lobbying and public policy
issues
Corporate best
practice on lobbying disclosure is evolving, both on spending
transparency and consistency of public policy positions.
|
· |
Companies have begun producing reports which assess the
alignment between company positions, including on climate change,
and the positions and lobbying of their key trade
associations.14 Examples of companies producing reports
include BP15, CSX, Ford Motor Company, GM and
Shell.16 |
|
· |
Abbott’s trade association disclosure lags many of its peer
group members which disclose their trade associations payments and
the amounts used for lobbying, including 3M, Becton Dickinson,
Boston Scientific, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson & Johnson,
Medtronic, Merck and United Technologies.17 |
4. The
board statement of opposition confuses lobbying and election
spending
This proposal
specifically addresses the Company’s lobbying activities, not its
involvement in elections and campaigns for political office. In
fact, Abbott has been recognized for its election spending
disclosure by the Center for Political Accountability (CPA). Its
annual Zicklin Index, prepared in collaboration with the Wharton
School, places Abbott among the 148 first tier companies. This is
to be commended, but it does not in any way address lobbying, the
subject of this proposal. In the Board’s statement of opposition,
it conflates electoral and lobbying spending and implies that the
CPA recognition is for lobbying disclosure as well as election
spending. It is not. To so state is misleading.
_____________________________
10
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGN%20Political%20Lobbying%20%26%20Donations%202017.pdf
11
https://www.conference-board.org/blog/environmental-social-governance/Record-Support-Political-Activity-SHPs
12
https://www.asyousow.org/press-releases/2021/6/24/record-breaking-year-for-environmental-social-and-sustainable-governance-shareholder-resolutions
13
https://ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/shareholders-escalate-campaign-pressing-companies-walk-their-talk
14
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2020/02/25/bp-pull-out-trade-groups-over-climate-policies/
15
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/bp-magazine/bp-releases-trade-associations-report.html
16
https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2019/shell-publishes-reports-on-industry-associations-sustainability.html
17
3M, Becton Dickinson, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck disclose their
trade association payments used for lobbying. Boston Scientific,
Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, and United Technologies disclose
also disclose their trade association payments, as well as the
amounts of those payments used for lobbying.
And digging
more deeply into the Zicklin ratings tells a different story. Most
of the indicators with the highest potential scores relate directly
to elections – e.g. spending on candidates, parties, 527 groups,
and independent expenditures – but on indicators that do overlap
with lobbying – trade associations and 501(c)4 groups – Abbott
scores 3 of 6 on the former and 0 on the latter. In other words, in
these specific areas, CPA agrees that Abbott’s disclosure is
lacking.
5. Lack of
transparency on lobbying creates risk
Corporations
make payments to trade associations that are used lobby indirectly
on their behalf without specific disclosure or accountability.
Since the trade associations represent that they speak for their
member companies, there can be misalignment between trade
association positions and company policy positions. Reputational
damage stemming from this misalignment between general policy
positions and actual direct and indirect lobbying efforts may harm
long-term shareholder value.
Abbott
shareholders face a trade association blind spot, as Abbott fails
to disclose all of its trade association memberships, and does not
disclose its trade association payments, nor the portions of these
payments used for lobbying.
|
· |
Abbott currently lists 2020 memberships18 in 14
trade associations, including the Business Roundtable (BRT),
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce.
Together these three trade associations spent over $108 million on
federal lobbying for 2020,19 yet shareholders have no
way to know how much of this is comprised of Abbott’s payments, nor
can they see how much of the Company’s trade association payments
go towards lobbying. |
|
· |
Abbott serves on the board of the Advanced Medical Technology
Association (AdvaMed)20 and belongs to the Medical
Device Manufacturers Association, which have drawn scrutiny for
lobbying to weaken mandatory disclosure of medical device
incidents, as well as lobbying on decreasing taxes on devices,
increasing insurance coverage and reimbursement and the FDA’s
approval process for bringing a device to market.21 |
Further, Abbott
doesn’t disclose 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations spending
(aka dark money), including all payments used for lobbying, as
requested by the proposal. Social welfare groups can engage in
lobbying. Proponents and other supporters of this resolution
are asking Abbott to illustrate its commitment to corporate
political responsibility by disclosing ALL payments to third-party
groups that use our dues money to influence policy (‘dark money
payments’).
|
· |
"Phony Grassroots” Campaigns - There are multiple examples of
pharmaceutical industry’s involvement in campaigns which solicit
criticism from outside groups, some of which it finances or staffs,
to create the impression of a
broad-based support for positions. |
|
· |
Abbott supports social welfare groups like the Alliance for
Aging Research, which lobbies and ran Facebook ads opposing drug
pricing legislation.22 |
_____________________________
18
https://www.abbott.com/investors/governance/corporate-political-participation.html.
19
OpenSecrets.org, (Business Roundtable
- $16,970,000; National Association of Manufacturers - $9,268,000;
U.S. Chamber of Commerce - $81,910,000), accessed March 11,
2022.
20
https://www.advamed.org/members/board-directors
21
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/medical-device-makers-spend-millions-lobbying-loosen-regs-d-c-n940351
22
https://www.prwatch.org/news/2020/01/13525/ex-pharma-lobbyist-embedded-white-house-tanked-drug-pricing-bill-while-his-former.
Abbott has
its lobbying information and could easily report it to
shareholders
Abbott claims
that “[p]reparing and maintaining the report … would have added
cost and effort but not increased shareholder value.” and
“[r]ehashing existing disclosures would needlessly waste corporate
resources.” But these arguments are disingenuous, as Abbott is
required to report its federal and state lobbying and already has
all of this information. In fact, elsewhere in the statement of
opposition, it says “every year, the Board's Public Policy
Committee reviews a report of Abbott's major trade association
memberships, the amount of dues, and the amount used for lobbying.”
In other words, the report already exists and could easily be
provided to shareholders.
For all of the
above reasons, we believe that Abbott’s current lobbying
disclosures are inadequate to protect shareholder interests. We
urge you to vote FOR Item 7, the shareholder proposal requesting a
report on the Company’s lobbying expenditures.
Sincerely,
Tim
Brennan
Special
Advisor on Responsible Investing
Unitarian
Universalist Association
This is not
a solicitation of authority to vote your proxy. Please DO NOT send
us your proxy card; the Unitarian Universalist Association
is not able to vote your proxies, nor does this communication
contemplate such an event. The Unitarian Universalist
Association urges shareholders to vote for Item 4 following the
instructions provided on management’s proxy mailing.
6
Abbott Laboratories (NYSE:ABT)
Historical Stock Chart
Von Mai 2022 bis Jun 2022
Abbott Laboratories (NYSE:ABT)
Historical Stock Chart
Von Jun 2021 bis Jun 2022